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A Revision of “the Irish Exception”: Seán Murphy,  




The article reframes Irish wartime neutrality. It posits that Ireland’s policy towards Vichy 
France conformed to the prevailing legal interpretations in the field of diplomatic recogni-
tion. This was consistent with the practice of Ireland’s longstanding recognition policy from 
the 1930s until the 1960s. An enigma, however, envelops Ireland’s retention of the Irish 
Minister to the Republic of France, Seán Murphy, after the fall of Marshall Philippe Pétain 
in August 1944. Charles de Gaulle’s Provisional Government demanded the replacement of 
all heads of missions who had served in France during the Vichy interlude. This violated the 
traditional practice of recognition law as understood by Ireland and other neutrals. But the 
neutrals, with the exception of Ireland, reluctantly complied with the demand. How did the 
Irish Department of External Affairs succeed in circumventing this? No evidence of an illusive 
“back channel”, that some authors speculate ended the accreditation crisis, has been found. 
There is limited evidence that secondary factors, such as the proposed establishment of an Irish 
Red Cross Hospital in Normandy, played a direct or significant role in senior French deci-
sion makers’ calculations to reverse their policy in the case of Murphy. This article offers a 
fresh explanation for France’s extension of a dispensation to Ireland: on petition from the Irish 
government, René Massigli, the new French Ambassador in London, made two decisive inter-
ventions which altered the climate of opinion in Paris and enabled Seán Murphy to remain. 
“We had no quarrel with any group of Frenchmen and our one desire with regard to France 
was to see her whole people united under one Government… We did not want quarrels 
between Frenchmen in Ireland 1.”
Keywords: Word War II, Irish neutrality, Vichy, recognition policy, international relations
Résumé
L’article apporte une nouvelle perspective sur la neutralité irlandaise en temps de guerre. Le pos-
tulat de départ est que la stratégie irlandaise envers le gouvernement français de Vichy était conforme 
aux interprétations légales de l’époque dans le domaine des relations diplomatiques. Ceci correspon-
dait avec la politique de relations internationales irlandaise depuis les années 1930 et jusque dans 
les années 1960. Le fait que l’ambassadeur irlandais de la République française, Seán Murphy, 
soit resté en poste après la chute du maréchal Pétain en août 1944 reste cependant une énigme. 
Le gouvernement provisoire de Charles de Gaulle a en effet exigé le replacement de tous les chargés 
de missions ayant officié en France durant l’interlude de Vichy, ce qui allait à l’encontre des habi-
1.  Minute by J. P. Walshe, 22 June 1944 (National Archives of Ireland, Dublin [hereafter NAI], Department of 
Foreign Afairs [hereafter DFA], Secretary’s Oice Files [hereafter SOF], A. 2).
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tudes de l’Irlande et des autres pays neutres en matière de relations diplomatiques. Les pays neutres, 
à l’exception de l’Irlande, furent quand même forcés de se soumettre à cette volonté. Comment le 
ministère des Affaires Extérieures irlandais a-t-il réussi à contourner cet écueil ? Aucune preuve de 
l’existence d’un illusoire « canal alternatif », auquel certains auteurs attribuent la fin de la crise des 
habilitations, n’a jamais été révélée. Il n’existe que peu d’éléments confirmant l’influence directe ou 
significative de facteurs secondaires, comme la proposition de construction d’un hôpital de la Croix 
Rouge irlandaise en Normandie, sur le changement de politique des décisionnaires français en ce qui 
concerne Murphy. Cet article offre une nouvelle explication à la dispense accordée à l’Irlande par la 
France : René Massigli, le nouvel ambassadeur français à Londres, est intervenu deux fois de façon 
décisive, grâce à une pétition du gouvernement irlandais, et a influencé les courants d’opinion à 
Paris, permettant à Sean Murphy de rester à son poste. « Nous n’avions pas de différends avec aucune 
faction française, et notre plus cher désir concernant la France était de voir son peuple uni sous un 
seul et même gouvernement… Nous ne voulions pas créer de tensions à l’intérieur de la communauté 
française en Irlande. »
Mots clés  : Seconde Guerre mondiale, neutralité irlandaise, Vichy, politique de reconnaissance, 
relations internationales
• Introduction
Ireland holds an intriguing but ambiguous privilege: it was the only neutral 
state permitted to retain its diplomatic representative to France into the post-
liberation period by Charles de Gaulle’s Provisional Government (Gouvernement 
provisoire de la République française or GPRF). His Irish counterpart was Eamon 
de Valera and parallels are sometimes drawn between the two, not least in their 
self-ascribed roles as national conservatives, statebuilders and as interpreters of the 
national will 2. Eamon de Valera held the portfolio of Taoiseach, in addition to 
that of Minister for External Affairs, which granted authority to the Department 
of External Affairs domestically and internationally. The department was based in 
Iveagh House, Dublin, and during the period of August, September and October 
1944 it struggled for the recognition of Seán Murphy as the Irish Minister to the 
Republic of France by the new French government. Murphy had served as the 
Irish Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Republic of France 
since 1938. Dublin viewed the GPRF’s acquiescence to Murphy’s continuation in 
post as an incontestable right and a validation of Ireland’s entitlement to pursue 
neutrality.
Previous Irish diplomacy vis-à-vis Vichy was indistinguishable from that of the 
other European neutrals, in particular that of the traditional neutrals Switzerland 
2.  Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2007, p. 4, 5. Cf. J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: 
Politics and Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 342.
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and Sweden which were viewed in Irish diplomatic circles as setting the bench-
mark for neutrality. The “Irish exception” has fascinated authors such as Dermot 
Keogh, Robert Patterson, Phyllis Gaffney, Christophe Gillissen and Joe Carroll, 
who have endeavoured to account for the consideration shown to Ireland 3. The 
challenge is that the documentary record is fragmentary and confused. This 
reflects the chaotic conditions in France in late 1944 during and immediately 
after liberation leading to delays in the Provisional Government’s installation and 
the Quai d’Orsay’s re-establishment in Paris. Communications were disrupted as 
the Allies prioritised the prosecution of the war against Nazi Germany.
This article contends it was not the tentative “Irish back channel”, suggested 
by Dermot Keogh and Robert Patterson 4, which ensured de Gaulle’s drama-
tic intercession to retain Seán Murphy. Keogh calculated that the close relation-
ship between Frederick Boland and Hervé Alphand contributed to the accom-
plishment of the Irish opt-out 5. Hervé was the son of Charles Alphand, the first 
French Minister to Ireland (appointed 1930). He adhered to the CFLN and 
advised de Gaulle on economic affairs, becoming Director General of Econo-
mic Affairs in the Quai d’Orsay in September 1944 6. By 1944 Boland was the 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and he knew Hervé 
Alphand well from the early 1930s. A sister of Hervé Alphand was married to an 
Irishman, Michael FitzGerald. Keogh and Patterson speculated that the Boland-
Alphand personal associations secured the Irish a hearing with de Gaulle for their 
right to retain Murphy. They pointed out that in early October 1944 de Gaulle 
requested that the Quai d’Orsay explain why Murphy had been “badly received” 
and demanded an explanation from the French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, 
3.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1989: A Diplomatic and Political History, Cork and Dublin, Hiber-
nian, 1989, p. 138-41, 156-60, 182-9; Joe Carroll, “A French View of Irish Neutrality”, Études Irlandaises, xiv: 2 
(Dec. 1991), p. 159-164; Dermot Keogh, “Ireland, de Gaulle and World War II”, in Pierre Joannon, De Gaulle 
and Ireland, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1991, p. 23-52; Phyllis Gafney, “Why was Ireland 
given Special Treatment? he Awkward State of Franco-Irish Diplomatic Relations, August 1944-March 1945”, 
Études Irlandaises, xxiv, no 1 (Spring 1999), p. 151-62; Robert Patterson, “Ireland, Vichy and Post-Liberation 
France, 1938-50”, in Michael Kennedy and J. M. Skelly (eds), Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Indepen-
dence to Internationalism (Dublin, 2000), p. 96-115; Christophe Gillissen, “France”, in Mervyn O’Driscoll, 
Dermot Keogh and Jérôme aan de Wiel (eds.), Ireland through European Eyes: Western Europe, the EEC and 
Ireland, 1945-1973, Cork, Cork University Press, 2013, p. 78-80. hese empirical studies were invaluable, and 
Keogh’s work was pioneering. 
4.  Dermot Keogh, “Ireland, de Gaulle and World War II”, art. cit., p. 23-52; Robert Patterson, “Ireland, Vichy and 
Post-Liberation France, 1938-50”, art. cit., p. 96-115.
5.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 187; Dermot Keogh, “Ireland, de Gaulle and World War II”, art. 
cit., p. 24; Robert Patterson, “Ireland, Vichy and Post-liberation France”, art. cit., p. 111. 
6.  “Ex-French Ambassador Hervé Alphand Dies”, Washington Post, 19 January 1994, [https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/archive/local/1994/01/19/ex-french-ambassador-herve-alphand-dies/6652ccde-eab6-4b12-
8918-bd38bd0f4d57/] (accessed 14 February 2016); “Deaths Elsewhere: Hervé Alphand, 86 an aide to 
Charles de Gaulle during…”, Baltimore Sun, 19 January 1994. [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-01-19/
news/1994019076_1_gaulle-ambassador-prime-minister] (accessed 14 February 2016).
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accounting for the state of the bilateral relationship. He argued that France 
“should attach care and importance” to the relationship 7. But Keogh supplied no 
documentary or oral evidence for the Alphand “back channel” that he claimed 
was responsible for de Gaulle’s dramatic intervention. This suggestion of an 
Alphand “back channel” has influenced subsequent authors’ interpretations.
Phyllis Gaffney has presented “a slightly different – though perhaps comple-
mentary – perspective on the affair 8”. Her findings emerged from her research 
on the establishment of an Irish Red Cross hospital in Normandy. This initia-
tive, heavily supported by the Irish government, was designed to alleviate the 
suffering of the inhabitants of Saint-Lô in late 1944 and 1945 9. Saint-Lô was 
one of the settlements ravaged by vicious town-to-town fighting between Allied 
and German forces in Normandy after D-Day. Gaffney reasoned France’s des-
perate need for medical philanthropy was one component of a multifactorial 
calculation at the heart of de Gaulle’s exceptional treatment of Murphy. She 
contends that le médecin-général, Adolphe Sicé, a follower of de Gaulle since 
1940, was a strong supporter of the Irish humanitarian initiative. He had res-
ponsibility for the medical relief of Normandy following D-Day. Through his 
strong links with the French Red Cross, Gaffney contends, he encouraged the 
Irish Red Cross to implement its offer of relief. Medical supplies and trained 
medical personnel were scarce in France in late 1944 10. But Gaffney adduced 
no evidence that Sicé petitioned de Gaulle to seek a dispensation for Murphy 
in order to smooth the Irish decision to proceed with setting up of the Saint-
Lô Hospital. Sicé does not appear in the Quai d’Orsay or Charles de Gaulle 
papers associated with the Murphy accreditation crisis. Gaffney’s thinking is 
certainly appealing, but if Saint-Lô was a factor motivating the French reversal 
on Murphy’s status, it was a marginal or intangible consideration. It was not the 
primary cause.
Gaffney has also reasoned that either the Quai or de Gaulle, or both, calcula-
ted that Éire’s distant and anomalous membership of the British Commonwealth 
could be exploited to expand French influence. She highlighted the prospect of 
improved air and sea links between France and Ireland, and the opportunity of 
introducing the French language as a subject in secondary schools. This would 
flatter French national pride at a psychic level following the humiliations of World 
War Two 11. However, French ambitions to expand its influence were less than 
acute in early October 1944, especially in such a marginal region as Ireland; the 
7.  Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets, Juin 1943-Mai 1945 (Paris, 1983), p. 327-328.
8.  Phyllis Gafney, “Why was Ireland given Special Treatment?”, art. cit., p. 153.
9.  Phyllis Gafney, Healing Amid the Ruins: he Irish Hospital at Saint-Lô (1945-46), Dublin, A & A Farmar, 1999.
10.  Phyllis Gafney, “Why Was Ireland given Special Treatment?”, art. cit., p. 158.
11.  Ibid., passim.
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GPRF struggled with the more immediate concern of instituting effective control 
over the French ship of state.
One argument proposed by Gaffney, however, has a more direct bearing on 
French calculations. The Quai d’Orsay appreciated Iveagh House’s arguments 
that a French request for new letters of credence for either Murphy or for a repla-
cement for Murphy would open “a can of worms”: King George VI, as head of 
the British Commonwealth, had to confirm all new letters of credence including 
Éire’s 12. Gaffney was correct in observing that Anglo-Irish relations were strai-
ned – the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was a harsh and unrelenting 
critic of both Irish neutrality and independence. Neutrality was anomalous in the 
British Commonwealth: all the other white Dominions supported the British war 
effort. Iveagh House avoided requesting that King George VI sign new letters of 
credence after neutrality was declared. Gaffney suggested that GPRF preferred to 
avoid entanglement in this delicate matter 13. There is value in this line and the 
article supports the contention that such calculations contributed to France’s flexi-
bility towards Seán Murphy. However, they were secondary rather than primary 
considerations.
This article argues for a revision of existing views. It explores Christophe Gil-
lissen’s recent argument that the Quai d’Orsay forwarded the recommendation of 
the French Ambassador in London, René Massigli, to de Gaulle, and that this 
was what initiated the reversal of French policy. Gillissen does not explain who in 
the Quai took the unusual step of forwarding Massigli’s advice to the President 14. 
Gillissen’s proposal deserves deeper investigation. This article supports the conten-
tion: it was René Massigli who secured the Quai’s turnaround in Ireland’s favour. 
He interceded with the Quai not once, but twice, and both times he secured a 
sympathetic hearing for Ireland’s case defusing the diplomatic crisis. He was the 
catalyst who ensured Iveagh House’s case in favour of Seán Murphy was heeded 
in Paris. It was not just Charles de Gaulle who transformed the intransigence 
of the officers of the Quai; Georges Bidault, the Foreign Minister, also played a 
noteworthy role in adopting an accommodating approach to Seán Murphy and 
Charles de Gaulle’s intervention simply reinforced the Bidault revision. Bidault’s 
role has been completely ignored by all previous authors. This article finds, 
however, Keogh’s explanation for the resolution of the crisis is not invalid – an 
older Irish-French diplomatic link assisted in the resolution of the crisis, though it 
was by accident not design and Hervé Alphand was not involved.
12.  Phyllis Gafney, “Why was Ireland given Special Treatment?”, art. cit., p. 155; Laforcade to Afaires Étrangères, 
Télégramme, 19 September 1944 (Afaires étrangères – Archives Diplomatiques [hereafter AEAD], série Eu-
rope 1944-1970, sous-série Irlande, vol. 219, no 3)
13.  Phyllis Gafney, “Why was Ireland given Special Treatment?”, art. cit., p. 154.
14.  Christophe Gillissen, “France”, art. cit., p. 78-80.
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One might be forgiven for claiming all of this scholarly argument surrounding 
Murphy’s retention as the Irish Minister is arcane, but it is not. From de Valera 
and Joe Walshe’s perspectives, neutrality depended on external perception and 
adherence to diplomatic protocol. When Murphy gained permission to remain 
as Irish Minister, it was an “implicit concession 15” signifying French respect for 
neutrality and the probity of Irish arguments. Dermot Keogh was correct: French 
acquiescence on the matter was a significant “diplomatic achievement” from the 
de Valera’s and Walshe’s perspectives 16; it was perceived as an endorsement of the 
integrity of Irish neutrality.
This article has two parts. First, the article frames Irish recognition policy 
within the setting of Irish neutral diplomacy toward the French republic after 
the Fall of France in May 1940. It illustrates how Irish policymakers, in parti-
cular Joseph Walshe, mediated between the competing claims of French factions 
for recognition. De Gaulle and his Free French movement became the focal 
point for resistance against Vichy. De Gaulle represented the Comité française 
de la Libération nationale (CFLN) as the “alternative France 17”, deserving de 
jure recognition as the legitimate government of the Republic of France. Fol-
lowing the liberation of France in late summer 1944, he declared the CFLN 
was the Provisional Government of France (GPRF). This article does not follow 
the intricate twists and turns of the Vichy and anti-Vichy forces, or the Irish 
interpretation thereof, for reasons of complexity and space; these are adequately 
outlined elsewhere 18. Instead, it evaluates Irish diplomacy towards France in a 
comparative and legal light. Unlike previous work, it contextualises Irish diplo-
macy towards the French state after May 1940 within the milieu of the recogni-
tion policy practiced by other states at the time, particularly the neutrals and 
Allies. The initial sections of this article propose that Ireland’s policy towards 
Vichy conformed to prevailing legal practice to a degree that is not normally 
appreciated.
15.  Phyllis Gafney, “Why was Ireland given Special Treatment”, art. cit., p. 153.
16.  Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, op. cit., p. 191.
17.  Peter Davies, France and the Second World War: Occupation, Collaboration, and Resistance, London, Routledge, 
2001, p. 56.
18.  A substantial literature evaluates the internal politics of Vichy, but comparatively limited scholarship has been 
published on its foreign dimensions. For Vichy diplomacy see: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Politique étrangère de la 
France: L’Abîme, 1939-1944, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1982; Special issue: “Les politiques extérieures de la 
France pendant la deuxième Guerre Mondiale”, Relations Internationales, 107 (2001); Peter Jackson and Smith 
Kitson, “he Paradoxes of Vichy Foreign Policy, 1940-42”, in J. R. Adelman (ed), Hitler and his Allies in World 
War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 79-115. For Vichy’s domestic aspects see for exemplary 
purposes: Julian Jackson, France: he Dark Years, 1940-44, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; Robert 
Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, London, Barrie & Jenkins, 1972; François-Georges Dreyfus, 
Histoire de Vichy, Paris, Perrin, 1990; Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation, 
1940-1945, London, Macmillan, 2002. 
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The second portion of the article scrutinises Irish-French diplomacy after 
D-Day when the crisis relating to Murphy’s reception by de Gaulle’s forces gra-
dually came to light. The primary attentions of this part are devoted to recons-
tructing the events that led to the Provisional Government’s retreat from its 
demand to replace Murphy.
The methodology adopted by this article is a blend of a comparative fra-
mework and the empirical archival approach. It consists of a reading of internatio-
nal legal history and the recognition policies of other states, in combination with 
a close reading of primary sources (mainly diplomatic records) from the Archives 
of the Quai d’Orsay and the Irish National Archives during the crucial period 
of late September and early October 1944, when the fate of Seán Murphy hung 
in the balance. These archives house the historical records of the French Foreign 
Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland 19. In addition, the de 
Gaulle papers in the Archives nationales in Paris were consulted. The article will 
now examine Irish recognition policy and its attitude towards Vichy, in compari-
son to other states.
• Recognition Policies
Paula Wylie led the way with the systematic examination of Irish recognition 
policy from 1949 to 1963 20, but nothing similar exists for the pre-1949 period 
of Irish diplomacy. In line with the Estrada Doctrine (1930) and the Montevi-
deo Convention (1933), Eamon de Valera unyieldingly adhered to the view that 
“recognition of a state is irrevocable and anterior to a government” and “recogni-
tion [of a state] should be unconditional [i.e. not dependent on the government 
of that state] 21”. Wylie identified de Valera’s policy during the Spanish Civil War 
as the first example of such an Irish policy of recognition 22.
However, there were several other examples of this practice before 1949, 
including the notorious incident involving de Valera’s offer of condolences to the 
German Ambassador in the latter’s private residence in May 1945 on the death of 
the German head of state, Adolf Hitler 23. The legal argument was that de Valera was 
recognising the German state and not the Nazi Government or the person of Hitler. 
As early as September 1934, de Valera adopted similar legal thinking to argue for 
the Soviet Union’s admission into the League of Nations, despite major domestic 
19.  he title of the department was Department of External Afairs until 1971.
20.  P. L. Wylie, Ireland and the Cold War: Diplomacy and Recognition, 1949-63, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 
2006.
21.  Ibid., p. 3, 5.
22.  Ibid., p. 2-3. 
23.  Dermot Keogh, “Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An Analysis of International Reaction to the Visit to the Ger-
man Minister, May 1945”, in Irish Studies in International Afairs, iii, no 1 (1989), p. 69-92. 
Mervyn O’Driscoll
80 •
Irish objections 24. By so doing, Ireland recognised the Soviet Union as a de jure state 
and the Communist government as its de jure or legitimate government.
Identical Irish and international practice is observable in relation to Italy in 
October 1943. Then following the overthrow of Benito Mussolini and King Victor 
Emmanuel III’s conferring of the post of Prime Minister on General Pietro Bado-
glio, Ireland continued to recognise the pre-existing Italian Minister to Ireland, 
Vincenzo Berardis: he had served the French state and not a particular govern-
ment 25. Likewise on his assumption of the Italian Premiership Badoglio automa-
tically “notified the Diplomatic Corps [in Rome] that there was no constitutional 
change and that relations with Foreign States would continue as heretofore 26”.
There is greater continuity in Irish recognition policy under de Valera’s 
direction before 1948 than is acknowledged in the pioneering work of Wylie 
or in empirical narratives of Irish foreign policy. In the case of Vichy France, 
Dublin observed the conventional interpretation of recognition that prevailed. 
It recognised the Republic of France and upheld diplomatic relations with the 
Vichy Government, but this did not imply approval of that state’s system of 
government (authoritarian) or its policies (collaboration with the Nazis) even if 
such a powerful official as Joseph Walshe, the Secretary of External Affairs, was 
initially attracted by the religious, social and educational policies of Philippe 
Pétain 27. Personal predilections were not considerations – international law 
demanded the maintenance of diplomatic relations. Conventional legal practice 
was upheld by the Irish state.
As can be detected, recognition is a complex concept in international law 28. 
In recent times, the maintenance of full diplomatic relations has been portrayed 
popularly as a sign of approval of a government. But this is not a correct reading 
of traditional diplomatic practice and convention. It is a popular misconception 
that arose during the Cold War when on several occasions ideology overrode 
diplomatic convention and international law in the East-West conflict: the with-
drawal of diplomats was employed as a device to signal disapproval of the policies 
24.  Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919-1946: International Relations, Diplomacy and Poli-
tics, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 1996, p. 199.
25.  Memorandum by Rynne for Walshe, 15 October 1943, Doc. 335 in Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, vol vii, 
p. 347-349.
26.  MacWhite to Walshe, 24 February 1944 (NAI, DFA SOF P 30).
27.  Walshe’s attraction to the political conservatism, authoritarianism and national regeneration policies of Pétain 
are fully covered in Dermot Keogh, “Ireland, de Gaulle and World War II”, art. cit. Seán Murphy’s eforts to 
correct Walshe’s misconceptions are explored by Keogh. 
28.  See: G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: heory and Practice, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2005, 3rd edition, chapter 8; 
M. J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997; 
T.D. Grant, he Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution Westport, Praeger, CT, 1999; 
J.W. Young, Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p. 199, n. 2.
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or actions of governments on the other side of the divide 29. This was a diploma-
tic innovation and was legally contentious. The departure from convention was 
largely a product of the acute bipolar tensions.
The removal of diplomats as a sign of censure was not normally considered 
advisable before World War Two. It contravened the traditional interpretations. 
Full diplomatic relations was required once diplomats were exchanged between 
recognised de jure states; diplomatic relations were essential to maintain commu-
nications between states for the benefit of their citizens and the smooth functio-
ning of international politics 30. According to this perspective, governments and 
governance systems changed but the state persisted and it was the state, not the 
government, which was recognised. Individual governments were epiphenomena 
or transitory guardians of the state. The reciprocal exchange of diplomats and 
normal diplomatic relations were necessary to sustain unbroken exchanges and 
dialogue between two states when peace reigned between them. Diplomacy had a 
function to perform regardless of which government or what form of government 
ruled. Following the exchange of diplomats, bilateral diplomatic relations had to 
be maintained in the absence of hostilities, even if later governments were consi-
dered odious. Bearing this in mind, how did Irish diplomatic relations with Vichy 
compare to that of other states, both belligerent and neutral, after May 1940?
• Recognition of Vichy
“In normal times” before the Fall of France in May 1940, approximately 61 
diplomatic missions were present in France 31. Two dynamic factors led to the 
decline in that tally after June 1940. First, the number was reduced as the Allied 
nations gradually withdrew their diplomats – it took time for them to determine 
if Vichy was a puppet of Germany. At the beginning, as Jean Lacouture perorates, 
Vichy’s “international standing […] was high enough for all the great powers with 
the exception of Britain […] but including the USA, the USSR, the Third Reich, 
Italy, Japan, Spain and Canada (although a British dominion) to look upon it as 
the legitimate authority in France and to maintain their diplomatic relations with 
its government” after the summer of 1940 32. Following the breaking off of rela-
tions, the Allies still regarded Vichy as the lawful custodian of the French state. 
29.  Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, London, Routledge, 1997, 7th revised 
edition, p. 87. Previously the norm was to withdraw diplomatic relations on declaration of war.
30.  he exchange and preservation of full diplomatic or even consular relations was not necessary for a state to 
recognise another as de jure; only Great Powers could aford the expense of global diplomatic and consular 
networks, small ones could not.
31.  Murphy to Walshe, 2 January 1941 (NAI, DFA 219/1D).
32.  Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: he Rebel, 1890-1914, London, Norton, 1990, p. 283.
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Ireland, as a neutral, resisted Allied pressure to withdraw its diplomatic represen-
tatives from Vichy after 1942 on the grounds it would contravene neutrality 33.
The second reason for the decline in diplomatic missions in France was that 
the conquered states under German or Soviet rule (Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) 
no longer existed as independent states. By January 1941, the foreign envoys 
(Nuncio, Ambassadors, Ministers, Chargé d’Affaires) of 36 countries remained 
accredited to Vichy 34.
Britain was the first state to sever diplomatic relations with Vichy in July 
1940. It did so in the aftermath of the Royal Navy’s shelling the French Navy at 
Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July. This operation arose from British fears that the French 
Navy would fall into the possession of Germany following the signing of the 
Franco-German armistice. Britain did not declare war with France; however, it 
had no alternative but to withdraw its ambassador after its unprovoked attack. It 
still recognised Vichy as the de jure government of the Republic of France until 
the liberation in 1944. Britain sustained consular relations with the regime and 
Vichy’s consuls remained in post in major British cities 35. In July 1940 London 
recognised de Gaulle as the leader of all Free Frenchmen who rallied to the Allied 
cause outside of Vichy France. Thereafter, de facto recognition was expanded to 
include the French overseas territories that fell to de Gaulle’s Free French 36. It was 
not until Charles de Gaulle’s CFLN possessed Metropolitan France in late 1944 
that Britain recognised it as the legal government of the Republic of France 37.
Initially, the United States’ recognition policy towards Vichy and the Gaullist 
challenge paralleled Ireland’s. Until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, Washing-
ton maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy. On entering the war, it reassessed 
its stance towards Vichy in view of the growing evidence of the regime’s collabo-
ration with Nazi Germany. It finally had no alternative but to break relations with 
Vichy in November 1942, with the Anglo-American invasion of French North 
Africa (Operation Torch). This preparatory step for the invasion of southern Europe 
was a direct assault against the authority of Vichy. Nonetheless, it only withdrew de 
jure recognition from the Pétain government when it no longer controlled the terri-
tory of France 38. Until that point, Washington resisted granting de Gaulle and the 
33.  See Lyn Gorman, “Australia and Vichy: he Impact of Divided France, 1940-1944”, he Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, xxxxiii, no 2 (1997).
34.  Murphy to Walshe, 2 Jan. 1941 (NAI, DFA 219/1D).
35.  Nicholas Atkin, Forgotten French: Exiles in the British Isles, 1940-1944, Manchester, Manchester U.P., 2003, 
p. 141-84.
36.  Benjamin R. Payn, “French legislation in exile”, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 
hird Series, xxviii, no 3/4 (1946), p. 47-48.
37.  Jean Lacouture, Rebel, op. cit., p. 353-54.
38.  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in 
Exile, Oxford, Clarendon, 1998, p. 107, 297.
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CFLN legitimacy as claimants to the French state 39. Washington finally recognised 
the GPRF as the de jure government of France in October 1944 40. The relations 
between de Gaulle and America were notoriously embittered for the duration of the 
period from 1941 to 1944. Milton Viorst has described them as ‘hostile allies 41’, 
while Robert Dallek has memorably written: “The only thing worse than having 
allies is not having them, Churchill once said. When it came to each other Franklin 
Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle were not so sure 42.”
Until 1944, Dublin maintained the externalities of neutrality in common with 
fellow neutrals and nonaligned states. It was important to fall into step with the 
precedents set by the traditional neutral states, Switzerland and Sweden, as well 
as the Vatican. The latter retained a potent influence on the Irish mind for reli-
gious reasons, but this was especially the case with the Irish foreign policy man-
darin, Joseph Walshe. In common with practically all states possessing a diploma-
tic relationship with the Republic of France before May 1940, Dublin recognised 
Vichy as the lawful government of France thereafter. As a neutral it preserved full 
diplomatic relations with it until 1944; a premature withdrawal of Irish diplo-
mats from Vichy could be construed as a sign of censure. In August 1944 German 
forces compelled Pétain to leave France, the Allied invasion of France was succee-
ding and Adolf Hitler did not want Pétain falling into Allied hands 43. Thus far, 
Ireland had consistently conformed to the standard practices of neutral states by 
rejecting Allied pressure to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Vichy. To do 
39.  Stefan Talmon, “Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for Governmental Le-
gitimacy in International Law”, in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon (eds), he Reality of International 
Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, Oxford, Clarendon, 1999, p. 510.
40.  See the useful overview: Denis Peschanski, “Legitimacy/Legitimation/Delegitimation: France in the Dark 
Years, a Textbook Case”, Contemporary European History, xiii, no 4 (2004), p. 409-23.
41.  Milton Viorst, Hostile Allies, New York, Macmillan, 1965.
42.  Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, New York, Oxford UP, 1995, 
p. 406. Vast historical evidence reiterates this incontrovertible conclusion and there remains much heated de-
bate in French and American literature: was the United States correct in seeking to displace de Gaulle as leader 
of the Free French or not? he long-running dispute is central in all scholarly work on de Gaulle’s relationship 
with the US during World War Two. Two overviews of the situation are: Robert Dallek, “Roosevelt and de 
Gaulle”, in Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl (eds.), De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reap-
praisal, Oxford, Berg, 1994, pp 49-60; Kim Muholland, “he United States and the Free French”, in Paxton et 
al., De Gaulle and the United States, p. 61-94. But see also: Julian G. Hurstield, America and the French Nation, 
1939-1945, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. Evidence of FDR’s hostility towards 
de Gaulle is widespread throughout Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s correspondence. See 
Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley and Manfred Jonas (eds.), Roosevelt and Churchill: heir Secret 
Wartime Correspondence, London, Barrie & Jenkins, 1975, p. 63, 251 n. 3, 335 n. 2, 338, 344, 345, 484 n. 2, 
541. Churchill and the British authorities used their diplomatic and rhetorical powers on numerous occasions 
to avoid Washington DC’s abandonment of de Gaulle. For example, see: homas R. Christoferson and Mi-
chael S. Christoferson, France during World War II: From Defeat to Liberation, New York, Fordham University 
Press, 2006, p. 135-136; François Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle, London, Fontana, 1990.
43.  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments, op. cit., p. 107.
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otherwise would signify political disapproval; this would contradict both neutra-
lity and the traditional interpretation of international law.
Regardless, the Irish government prepared for the diplomatic repercussions of 
the fall of Vichy and the Gaullist ascendancy. At this point close attention must 
be devoted to the Irish thinking underlying the decision to recognise de Gaulle’s 
diplomats as the agents of the effective government of France in August 1944. 
The transition commenced in mid-1943.
• Recognition of the CFLN/GPRF
On 3 June 1943, following the establishment of Allied control of French North 
Africa, Generals Giraud and de Gaulle founded the CFLN (encompassing the Free 
French) with Allied backing in Algiers. Within months de Gaulle outmanoeuvred 
Giraud and took sole leadership of the CFLN. The CFLN had jurisdiction over all 
the overseas territories liberated from Vichy and all French armed forces fighting 
Vichy. Recognising the oscillation in power politics, Dublin extended de facto reco-
gnition to the CFLN in November 1943 and the committee’s representative in 
Dublin. This acknowledged its factual existence (territorial jurisdiction and capacity 
to enter relations in late 1943) in non-Metropolitan France and it led to the exten-
sion of consular relations to the CFLN’s representatives 44.
The Department of External Affairs intended to phase out the Vichy mission as 
the de jure mission of the Republic of France to reflect military and political realities 
when appropriate (it was widely known that preparations for an Allied invasion of 
Western Europe were proceeding). The Vichy mission in Dublin was headed by M. 
Cauvet-Duhamel, who was known as a covert adherent to the CFLN (a form of 
double agent) by the Irish authorities. From late 1943 Ireland planned to replace 
the Vichy mission, with the full agreement of Cauvet-Duhamel, with a CFLN 
one as the de jure mission when Vichy was no longer an effective entity in France. 
Joseph Walshe’s concern was that the transition from Vichy to CFLN should not be 
publicised. Walshe and Iveagh House wished to avoid a public controversy and that 
diplomatic representation could smoothly transition 45.
The CFLN, led by de Gaulle, claimed the title of GPRF or Provisional 
Government on 2 June 1944 46. De Gaulle did not inform his allies, the US 
and UK, in advance. The Allies landed on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 
1944. Six days later the GPRF sent M. Lalouette to Dublin without providing 
advance notice to the Irish authorities. The GPRF instructed Lalouette to take up 
the post of secretary to the GPRF representative in Dublin, M. de Laforcade. On 
44.  Robert Patterson, “Ireland, Vichy and Post-Liberation France”, art. cit., p. 109.
45.  Walshe memorandum, 22 June 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, A 2).
46.  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments, op. cit., p. 79.
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his arrival, Walshe personally informed him and de Laforcade that Ireland would 
assist French reunification as it had no quarrel with any French faction. He also 
granted permission to Cauvet-Duhamel to go to the headquarters of the GPRF 
in Algiers to end his “equivocal situation” in late June 1944, whereby he acted as 
Chargé d’Affaires of Vichy in Dublin but secretly obeyed the CFLN 47.
However, until Pétain had actually fallen, External Affairs was only prepared 
to extend de facto recognition to the CFLN and de Gaulle. On 21 August, the 
department’s attitude was “to deal with the de facto authorities as they arise [in 
France] and to postpone defining [the Irish] position until authority becomes 
properly established [in France] 48”. Following Pétain’s declaration (23/34 August 
1944) that he no longer effectively controlled the French state, the way was clear 
for Ireland to transfer diplomatic relations 49. De Gaulle and the CFLN/GPRF 
marched victoriously down the Champs-Élysées on 26 August. A prompt deci-
sion was arrived at in Iveagh House that the GPRF controlled France de jure. On 
29 August de Laforcade was informed Ireland accepted him “in the fullest sense as 
Minister of France”. Walshe outlined the position:
Our country did not want to play politics with France. Our sole inte-
rest was to remain on friendly terms with his country, and we did not feel 
called upon to make a special declaration of recognition, our assumption 
being that it was exclusively the business of the French people. We pre-
ferred to regard ourselves as having been in continuing relations with France 
[the state], and we hoped for that and other reasons that it would not be 
necessary for Mr. Murphy to present new credentials. His credentials had 
been presented in 1938 to the Head of the French Republic, and the 
new Government, in so far as we were concerned, did not constitute any 
change in France’s governmental regime 50. [Author’s italics]
Remarkably, this Irish acknowledgement of the GPRF as the Government of 
the Republic of France predated comparable action on the part of the US and 
Britain by a comparable margin; as de Gaulle’s allies they should have acted expe-
ditiously to formalise recognition of the new government. The UK and the US 
only granted GPRF representatives “the use” of the former French Embassies in 
their countries on 14 September 51. It was not until 22 October 1944 that the 
Supreme Allied Commander formally transferred administrative control of France 
47.  Walshe memorandum, 22 June 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, A 2).
48.  Estero to Hibernia Vatican City, Personal Code Telegram, 21 August 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97). 
49.  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments, op. cit., p. 297.
50.  Walshe memo, “Recognition of Monsieur de Laforcade as Minister of the new French Government in Dublin”, 
29 August 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
51.  Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments, op. cit., p. 193, no 422.
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and Paris to the GPRF 52. The British and American governments officially reco-
gnised the CFLN as the Provisional Government of France on 23 October 1944, 
two months after the Irish 53. This Allied delay hinted at misgivings, particularly in 
the US, about sanctifying the accession of their vexing ally, Charles de Gaulle. If 
the Irish estimated their early recognition of the GPRF would purchase enhanced 
Irish-French relations, they were swiftly disabused.
• “No such persons are accredited to the French Republic”
The GPRF refused to recognise diplomats who had represented neutral 
governments at Vichy as heads of mission. Walshe received the first hints of its 
intentions in June 1944, but he discounted the possibility – it questioned the 
basis of a state to maintain neutrality under international law 54. In late August, 
de Laforcade reminded Walshe of the GPRF’s demand for a new Irish Minister 
to replace Murphy. Murphy was no longer acceptable as a diplomat representing 
Ireland to the Republic of France owing to “his long relations with the Vichy 
Government 55”.
The chaotic liberation and immediate post-liberation phases confounded 
Walshe’s efforts to regularise the situation. Communications were utterly disrup-
ted between Walshe and Murphy from at least early August until the end of Sep-
tember 1944. Walshe conducted talks with Laforcade regarding the recognition 
question and demanded Murphy’s retention “almost exclusively” through the 
French Legation in Dublin during this blackout 56. The GPRF’s treatment of 
Murphy perplexed Walshe in light of his interpretation of international law as it 
related to neutrality, diplomatic accreditation and relations between states. Walshe 
assumed his conversations with Laforcade would have the desired effect, and 
Laforcade’s reports to French Foreign Office in September revealed his sympathy 
for Walshe’s argumentation which he fatefully reproduced for his superiors. The 
French Minister’s report of 19 September informed the Quai of Walshe’s threat 
to remove recognition from the GPRF delegation as the de jure representatives of 
the Republic of France, if the Quai failed to grant reciprocity to Seán Murphy. 
Laforcade’s report was conspicuously sympathetic to the Irish position for several 
52.  Ibid., p. 79-80.
53.  Ibid., p. 212; Jean-Claude Allain, Pierre Guillen, Georges-Henri Soutou, Laurent heis & Maurice Vaïsse, 
Histoire de la Diplomatie Française, Paris, Perrin, 2007, vol. ii, p. 359.
54.  Walshe to Murphy, 30 September 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
55.  Walshe Memo, “Recognition of Monsieur de Laforcade as Minister of the New French Government in Dub-
lin”, 29 August 1944, ibid.
56.  For Walshe’s summation of the communication problems see: Walshe memorandum, “Recognition of New 
French Government”, n.d. (c. late October or early November 1944), ibid.
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reasons (the Irish Red Cross hospital, the letters of credence complications, 
French international influence, the pro-French sentiments of Ireland) 57.
Highlighting Iveagh House’s grave concerns about Murphy’s safety and whe-
reabouts in the chaotic warzone, Iveagh House vainly despatched repeated mes-
sages to Murphy as Vichy tumbled and the GPRF claimed control. For instance, 
in mid-August, Dublin telegrammed Murphy: “take no risks”, keep in “close 
touch with neutral colleagues especially the Papal Nuncio” and be guided by their 
general attitudes as the situation developed 58. It is unclear if Murphy received this 
or other instructions emitting from Iveagh House in August, but he made his way 
from Vichy to Paris with a convoy of the fellow neutral diplomats to establish 
relations with the new Provisional Government 59. He arrived in Paris on Monday, 
25 September 1944 60.
In the absence of contact Walshe was unaware of Murphy’s arrival in Paris. 
A  few days later in late September or early October he read the disturbing 
report of Reuter’s special correspondent in Paris with the dateline of 27 Sep-
tember. Harold King recounted that ten diplomats formerly accredited to Vichy 
had recently arrived in Paris headed by the Papal Nuncio. An unbending Quai 
d’Orsay, now under the control of the GPRF, upheld the policy conveyed to 
Walshe by Laforcade: it regarded Murphy and his neutral colleagues as “private 
persons”. An official stated: “We do not know any of these people […] No such 
persons are accredited to the French Republic 61.” Walshe was astonished.
Laforcade’s efforts to represent Irish interests to his superiors in the Quai had 
conspicuously failed. In addition, Laforcade experienced pronounced difficulty 
in communicating with Paris during the period of August and September, which 
aggravated the situation. Iveagh House’s imperative was to search for alternative 
lines of negotiation. Murphy was unreachable, but he was in Paris according to 
Reuters. Walshe urgently needed to instruct him to engage directly in negotiations 
with the Quai. It was imperative to brief Murphy to empower him to plead his 
case accurately with the Quai. In these exceptional circumstances, Walshe directed 
the Irish High Commissioner to London, John Dulanty, to approach René Massi-
gli, the newly appointed French ambassador in London 62. This turned out to be a 
masterstroke: Massigli became the key to overcoming the Quai’s resistance.
57.  Laforcade to Afaires Étrangères, 19 September 1944 (AEAD, Europe, Irlande 1944-1949, vol. 219, no 3).
58.  Estero (Dublin) to Hibernia (Vichy), Telegram, 16 August 1944, ibid.
59.  Murphy to Walshe, 28 September 1944, ibid. his minute was not received in External Afairs until 18 Oc-
tober 1944. 
60.  Murphy to Walshe, 28 September 1944 (NAI, DFA SOF P 97). Received on Tuesday 18 October 1944. 
61.  Report of Harold King, Reuter’s Special Correspondent, Paris, 27 September 1944, ibid.
62.  Walshe to Murphy, 30 September 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
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• The Massigli Connection
As it transpired Massigli was a distinguished Gaullist and his advice com-
manded attention in the Quai. A senior French professional diplomat with inter-
national connections before 1940, he was a “faithful” devotee of de Gaulle 63. The 
General held him in high esteem 64 and invited him to London in 1942 to take 
up the post of Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the CFLN. He occupied this 
until August 1944 when, following the GPRF’s assertion of authority, de Gaulle 
appointed him as the Ambassador of France to Britain. St James Court was a key 
posting 65.
In carrying out his instructions and speaking directly to Massigli, the Irish 
High Commissioner was assured of a high level hearing in Paris. On 29 Sep-
tember Dulanty met with Massigli and familiarised the Frenchman with the 
controversy and the communications breakdown for “the past ten weeks”. Mas-
sigli volunteered to use his diplomatic bag to forward Walshe’s instructions to 
Murphy 66. Massigli, a veteran diplomat, recognised the grave situation: Walshe 
was unshakeable in his determination to retain Murphy as minister perceiving 
that the Quai had affronted Ireland’s neutrality.
To prevent escalation, Massigli extracted a promise that Iveagh House would 
not revoke Laforcade’s recognition until he received clarification from the Quai. 
Then he telegrammed the Quai :
Si l’attitude de M. Murphy à Vichy n’a pas donné lieu à des remarques 
particulièrement défavorables, il semble que le Gouvernement Provisoire peut 
– s’il le juge opportun – retenir cet argument pour admettre M. Murphy à 
continuer à exercer ses fonctions au moins à titre temporaire. Cette attitude 
conciliante ne nous empêcherait pas de marquer au Gouvernement irlandais 
notre désir de voir se prolonger le moins possible la situation ainsi créée 67.
The Quai d’Orsay file contains a translation of Walshe’s letter for Murphy 68. 
Whether the Irish made this available or the Quai opened it before transmit-
63.  Jean Lacouture, Rebel, op. cit., p. 445. 
64.  In his memoirs de Gaulle refers to him as a man “of quality” and one of the “notables”. Charles de Gaulle, he 
Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Forge Village, Mass., Clarion/Simon & Schuster, 1972, p. 318, 
403. 
65.  Claire Andrieu, Philippe Braud et Guillaume Piketty, Dictionnaire de Gaulle, Paris, Robert Lafont, 1996, 
p. 734. his was a demotion according to some authors who claim that Massigli was too anglophile for de 
Gaulle’s tastes. See Martin homas, “Free France, the British Government and the Future of French Indochina 
1940-45”, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.). Independence through Revolutionary War, London, Routledge, p. 223-251.
66.  Walshe to Murphy, 30 September 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
67.  Massigli to Paris, Diplo 4880, 30 September 1944 (AEAD, Europe, Irlande 1944-1949, vol. 214, no 2).
68.  Traduction, Lettre de Joseph Walshe à Sean Murphy, 30 Sept. 1944 (AEAD, Europe, Irlande 1944-1949, 
vol. 214, no 2).
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ting it to Murphy is unclear. Regardless, the Quai was in no doubt about Wals-
he’s intentions to retaliate in kind. In his instructions to Murphy, Walshe infor-
med his subordinate that Ireland was “still somewhat mystified by some aspects 
of our relations with the French Government”. He directed Murphy to approach 
the Quai again to explain the position of Ireland, which he outlined in detail in 
his three page letter. Walshe informed Murphy that the GPRF’s suggestion that 
he should be replaced “could only be regarded as a somewhat unfriendly gesture 
directed against the Government rather than the representative of the neutral 
country concerned”. In the “disagreeable eventuality” that the Foreign Office per-
sisted in its refusal to recognise Murphy as head of the Irish mission to France, 
Walshe commanded Murphy to apprise the Quai: “We shall feel obliged to our 
very great regret to withdraw our recognition from M. de Laforcade, a recognition 
which was granted on the hypothesis that there would be no question about reco-
gnition of your position on the other side 69.”
Georges Bidault read and responded to Massigli’s telegram on 4 October:
En réponse à votre télégramme no. 4880, je suis heureux de pouvoir vous 
faire savoir que le Gouvernement provisoire de la République donne volon-
tiers son agrément en maintien de M. Murphy en qualité de Ministre de 
l’Irlande à Paris. Il y aurait lieu de prévoir pour lui la présentation de nou-
velles lettres de créance 70.
Matters were approaching a resolution. Bidault, lacking full knowledge of 
the Irish case, was willing to keep Murphy but new letters of accreditation were 
requested. As detected, the latter condition was unpalatable to Ireland, but 
Bidault conceded that Murphy was acceptable in principle, which was substantive 
progress. However, on 5 October Walshe received a telegram from Murphy pro-
viding a disheartening account of his failed effort to convince the Quai. As ins-
tructed, Murphy had met the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, Raymond 
Brugère. He reported: “I was very coldly received and rudely received by the 
Secretary General.” Brugère had bristled at the repetition of the argument that for 
Ireland “the Government de facto was the Government de jure, and the moment 
the Pétain Government had disappeared”, Ireland automatically entered into 
relations with the new government 71. Brugère “became irritable at the mention 
of the word ‘de facto’”. Murphy was rejected again and he was provided with 
no resources to communicate to Iveagh House 72. Murphy’s Legation colleague, 
Mr MacDonald, had to physically travel to the Irish Legation in Switzerland to 
69.  Walshe to Murphy, 30 September 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
70.  Bidault to London, no 122, 4 October 1944, (AEAD, Europe, Irlande 1944-1949, vol. 214, no 2).




despatch the telegram outlining the Quai’s second rebuff 73. This underscored the 
lack of consideration shown to Murphy. The Irish representative reported gloo-
mily on conditions as he saw them: “The general impression of the Foreign Office 
was excitable [sic] truculent. The Administration generally is chaotic 74.”
Why had the Secretary-General rejected Murphy so severely in view of the 
French Foreign Minister’s alteration of attitude? Poor timing was at play. Bidault 
responded to Massigli’s telegram on 4 October. No date is provided for the second 
rebuke the Secretary-General delivered to Murphy, but it probably predated 4 
October. It was unlikely that MacDonald travelled from Paris to Berne within 24 
hours to have Murphy’s telegram transmitted to Dublin, particularly in the condi-
tions prevailing in France in early October 1944. There was no mention in Mur-
phy’s telegram that new letters of credence were required to remain in post, which 
indicated Brugère had not been updated on Bidault’s recent decision.
Since Massigli had expedited communication with Murphy on 30 Septem-
ber and evinced sensitivity, Walshe pursued that link. This had the advantage of 
snubbing Laforcade and signalled the intention to withdraw recognition. Walshe 
phoned the Irish High Commissioner in London, John Dulanty, on the morning 
of 6 October to request the lodging of a protest with the French Embassy against 
the Quai’s unsatisfactory reception of Murphy, its failure to accept Murphy 
as minister and its implied derision of Irish neutrality. The High Commis-
sion immediately sent its Counsellor, John Belton, to the embassy to deliver the 
protest and to request that it forward a letter to Murphy. Massigli agreed to trans-
mit Walshe’s formal protest to the Quai, which included the following:
Rudeness to our representative was rudeness to Government […] We 
expected [an] immediate apology and complete acceptance of our repre-
sentative […] Failing that we should be obliged to withdraw our reco-
gnition from the French Legation here. […] [W]e had no alternative as 
[our] Government could not without sacriicing its sovereign right, allow 
its representative to be so treated or its right to neutrality so impugned 75.
Walshe’s instructions to Murphy were: as a small country Ireland did not “play 
politics” with recognition matters and a solution had to be negotiated with France 
“to put things right”. He admitted that the Quai’s treatment of Murphy was pro-
bably “due to frayed temper and inevitable annoyance with Vichy”. But Murphy 
was told to make contact with Paris again, “Another talk with Secretary General 
might put everything right”. Walshe had not retreated from his elementary posi-
73.  Hibernia to Estero Dublin, Telegram from Berne, 4 October 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
74.  Ibid.
75.  Estero to Hibernia (Berne), For Murphy, Telegram No. 103 Dearg, 9 October 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
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tion: it was paramount that Murphy was recognised as the Irish minister to enable 
“full relations” between the two countries 76.
At this point Massigli interceded again. He transmitted an extensive telegram 
to the Quai on 6 October. Believing that his previous suggestions had fallen on 
deaf ears, he reiterated that Murphy’s mission should be extended on the basis 
that his accreditation to France occurred in 1938 prior to the Vichy interlude. 
His extension could be subject to an assessment of his activities under the Vichy 
regime to determine whether he had revealed pro-Vichy tendencies between 1940 
and 1944. Massigli deduced that France had “little reason to be angry at Ireland’s 
neutrality”, unlike London and Washington (“nous n’avons guère de raison de tenir 
rigueur à l’Irlande de sa neutralité plus que ne le font Londres et Washington”) 77. 
France’s material interests had not been deleteriously affected by Ireland. Massi-
gli’s judgement could not be dismissed easily.
Particularly instructive are the lines of the telegram which were marked by a 
Quai official in the margin: “M. Murphy se plaindrait d’avoir été très mal reçu. Il se 
plaindrait, notamment, d’allusions qui auraient été faites en sa présence à la neutralité 
irlandaise. Enfin, on lui aurait indiqué très clairement que le Gouvernement Provi-
soire ne pouvait admettre le principe de son maintien à Paris en qualité de Ministre 
d’Irlande.” “Position révisée” is written in the margin opposite this final sentence. 
A further sentence of Massigli’s telegram had a vertical line drawn in the margin 
next to it: “Le Gouvernement Irlandais, ayant ipso facto reconnu le Gouvernement 
Provisoire, compte que son représentant en France bénéficiera du même traitement que 
M. de Laforcade à Dublin.” The vertical pencil line is accompanied by a hand-
written “Oui”, signifying agreement on the part of the official reading the docu-
ment 78. The marginalia highlight the points considered salient by the Quai offi-
cial. The assertion that Irish neutrality was affronted by the Quai in the presence 
of Murphy was identified as fateful; Walshe was not prepared to compromise. 
France’s unyielding application of the policy of not accepting foreign heads of 
missions who had served in Vichy imperilled cordial Irish-French relations.
The Quai official who annotated Massigli’s telegram wrote a brief note on it 
for Roger Gaucheron. This has proved challenging to decipher, but it appears to 
read: “La situation est disposée – les éléments d’une mise un point 79.” In subsequent 
correspondence on 17 November 1944 Murphy informed Iveagh House that 
Roger Gaucheron was “our friend” and “the person in the political section who 
deals with Ireland amongst other counties 80”. Serendipity played a part in the offi-
76.  London to Quai, Tel. No. 4,947 (AEAD, Europe, Irlande 1944-1949, vol. 214, no 2).
77.  Ibid. 
78.  Ibid. 
79.  Ibid.
80.  Murphy to Walshe, 17 November 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
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cial forwarding Massigli’s telegram for Gaucheron’s attention; Gaucheron was the 
appointed Secretary of the French Legation in Dublin in 1930 when the legation 
first opened in Dublin 81. As a result of this posting in the early 1930s, Gauche-
ron comprehended the Irish national position to some degree. It is probable, the-
refore, that Gaucheron was responsible for transmitting the Massigli telegram to 
President de Gaulle. De Gaulle was correctly concerned and he wrote a note to a 
member of his staff, Etienne Burin des Roziers, responsible for relations with the 
Quai d’Orsay:
1. Pourquoi a-t-on mal reçu M. Murphy, ministre d'Irlande ?
2. Je voudrais connaître le point de vue de M. Bidault sur la question de 
nos relations avec l'Irlande à laquelle je pense que nous devons attacher du 
soin et de l'importance 82.
Keogh, Patterson and Gillissen all argue that this intervention by de Gaulle 
reversed the Quai’s attitude. De Gaulle’s terse question and comment suggested 
care should be taken in France’s relations with Ireland. Massigli’s emphasis on 
relaying the bad reception Murphy had received and the objectionable implica-
tions transmitted regarding Irish neutrality had an effect. Perhaps de Gaulle, fol-
lowing his long struggle for the “soul of France” in Winston Churchill’s words, 
appreciated that Irish neutrality and its diplomatic requirements were vital in 
Irish endeavours to fortify political and foreign policy independence, in the same 
way that the Free French had depended on appeals to legitimacy, legalism and the 
performative 83? Numbered among de Gaulle’s ancestors were the McCartans of 
County Down who rebelled against English Law. He was knowledgeable of Irish 
history and held Daniel O’Connell in high estimation 84.
Ironically, de Gaulle’s arresting interposition was in all likelihood unneces-
sary. But it underwrote Bidault’s softened line of 4 October and subsequently 
eased flexibility on the letters of credence. Bidault, Massigli, Gaucheron and de 
Gaulle were all of a common view now to accommodate Murphy’s retention. 
Walshe’s unbending perseverance since August had succeeded. Eamon de Valera 
as the Minister for External Affairs was responsible for sanctioning Walshe’s rigid 
81.  Gaucheron is identiied as the inaugural Secretary of the Legation at: he Residence of France and its History, 
[http://www.ambafrance-ie.org/La-Residence-de-France-et-son] (accessed 12 February 2016).
82.  De Gaulle to Burin des Roziers, note, “after 6 October” (Archives Nationales, Paris, Archives de la Président 
de la République : Charles de Gaulle, 3 AG 4/14). I am very grateful to Professor Christophe Gillissen for 
drawing my attention to this.
83.  Regarding the contingency and utility of legitimacy as practiced by de Gaulle see: Denis Peschanki, “Legiti-
macy/Legitimation/Delegitimation: France in the Dark Years, a Textbook Case”, Contemporary European His-
tory, 13, 4 (November 2004), p. 409-423. 
84.  Pierre Joannon, “Charles de Gaulle and Ireland: A return to the sources”, in Joannon, De Gaulle and Ireland, 
p. 5-7; Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: he Ruler, 1945-1970, London, Harvill, 1992, p. 579-80.
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defence of neutrality in the closing months of World War Two, and the resolute 
Irish demand for keeping Murphy in France after the fall of Vichy conforms to 
this pattern.
An Audience with de Gaulle
The matter was not completely resolved as Phyllis Gaffney has revealed after 
the Quai relented on its demands for new letter of credence to be granted. Murphy 
still had to visit the new Head of Government in line with diplomatic custom. 
However, if Murphy was granted an official audience this would publicise the “Irish 
exception”. Iveagh House and the Quai negotiated a compromise. Murphy had 
been due to return home to Ireland for debriefing and long overdue leave. He had 
been trapped with his family in France by the war since 1940. Murphy’s taking of 
extended leave provided the Quai with a solution. It would allow the thorny issue 
of neutrals’ representation to recede from the public eye, and purchase time to engi-
neer a low-key way to satisfy the need for an audience with de Gaulle 85.
On his return to Paris, Murphy visited de Gaulle on Saturday, March 24, 
1945, “in what was described as ‘a private audience’” as opposed to a formal state 
audience. This proved to be a “cordial” affair. Murphy transmitted de Valera’s best 
wishes for de Gaulle’s personal wellbeing and his desire “to see France very soon 
retake her place amongst the great nations of the world”. A “very touched” de 
Gaulle responded in a telling fashion: “Ireland and France had always been friendly. 
There was no reason to quarrel […] He hoped, that after the war, the economic 
and cultural relations between the two countries would become closer. We shall all 
need our friends after the war. He expressed his great admiration for the Taoiseach and 
the manner in which he had kept his country neutral [author’s italics] 86.” De Gaulle’s 
words suggest sentimental factors played a role in solving the Franco-Irish diploma-
tic crisis. De Gaulle understood that in de Valera’s situation he would have adopted 
a similar neutrality policy during World War Two. De Gaulle, as a French natio-
nalist and an exponent of the primacy of the nation-state in international politics, 
was sensitive to respecting other states’ national interests and Ireland was a friend of 
France. He respected the Irish government’s perspective.
• Conclusion
In sum, the resolution of the Seán Murphy enigma does not reside in an 
Alphand-Boland “back channel” or the possible “complementary” factors identi-
85.  Murphy to Walshe, 17 November 1944 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97). 
86.  Murphy to Walshe, 26 March 1945 (NAI, DFA, SOF, P 97).
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fied by Gaffney. Complementary factors may have assisted, but there is no direct 
evidence that they did and they were not the primary actors or causes initiating 
the special consideration in any case. The primary considerations were mutual 
respect of national interests and their accommodation. Keogh was correct: a 
French diplomat who had served in the French Legation in Dublin in the early 
1930s played a central part in resolving the case. But it was Roger Gaucheron 
rather than Hervé Alphand, and it was not an Irish “back channel”. Secondly, 
Keogh and other authors are correct in underlining de Gaulle’s role in the reso-
lution of the accreditation crisis, but only to a degree. Georges Bidault’s line had 
softened significantly. De Gaulle’s intrusion in Quai matters made subsequent 
relaxation on the letters of credence easier. Principally, it was the experienced 
French diplomat, René Massigli, who played the role as the initiator in the gran-
ting of the Irish exception. Massigli and serendipity had avoided a major crisis in 
Franco-Irish relations.
